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In a unanimous deci-
sion, the United States Supreme 
Court in Citizens Bank ofMd. v. 
Strumpf, 116 S. Ct. 286 (1995), 
held that a creditor in a bank-
ruptcy action may, to protect its 
setoff rights, temporarily with-
hold payment of a debt that it 
owes to a debtor in bankruptcy 
without violating an automatic 
stay. The Court stressed that 
the requirement of an intent to 
permanently settle an account 
is implicit in Maryland's rule 
regarding setoff rights. In so 
ruling, the Court acknowledged 
that creditor banks may tempo-
rarily place an administrative 
freeze on a bankrupt debtor's 
checking account while seek-
ing relief from the automatic 
stay. 
When David Strumpf 
("Strumpf') filed for relief un-
derChapter 13 oftheBankrupt-
cy Code on January 25, 1991, 
he maintained a checking 
account with the Citizens Bank 
of Maryland ("Citizens"). 
Strumpf was also in default on 
the remaining balance of a 
$5,068.75 loan from Citizens. 
On October 2, 1991, Citizens 
placed an "administrative hold" 
on Strumpf s checking account, 
claiming a right to setoff. As a 
result, Citizens refused to pay 
withdrawals from the account 
that would have reduced the 
account balance below the 
amount due on Strumpf sloan. 
Five days later, Citizens filed a 
"Motion for Relief from Auto-
matic Stay and for Setoff' in 
the Bankruptcy Court under ti-
tle 11, section 362(d) of the 
United States Code. In re-
sponse, Strumpf filed a motion 
to hold Citizens in contempt, 
claiming that Citizens' admin-
istrative hold violated the sec-
tion 362(a) automatic stay. 
The Bankruptcy Court 
held that Citizens' administra-
tive hold constituted a setoff in 
violation of section 362(a)(7) 
and granted Citizens' motion 
for relief from the stay, autho-
rizing the bank to set off 
Strumpf s remaining checking 
account balance against the 
unpaid loan. On appeal, the 
United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland re-
versed, finding that an adminis-
trative hold was not a violation 
of section 362(a). The United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit reversed, con-
cluding that an administrative 
hold was equivalent to the exer-
cise of a right of setoff, violat-
ing the automatic stay of sec-
tion 362(a)(7). 
The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari 
to address the issue of whether 
a creditor bank in a bankruptcy 
action may, to protect its setoff 
rights, temporarily withhold 
payment of a debt that it owes to 
a debtor in bankruptcy without 
violating an automatic stay. Cit-
izens argued that the refusal to 
pay its debt to Strumpfwas not 
an exercise of the setoff right in 
violation of the automatic stay. 
Conversel y, the defense argued 
that the bank's administrative 
hold exercised dominion over 
property belonging to Strumpf 
and thus violated sections 
362(a)(3), 362(a)(6), and 
362(a)(7). 
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In an opinion written by 
Justice Scalia, the Supreme 
Court began its analysis by com-
menting that "the right of setoff 
allows entities that owe each 
other money to apply mutual 
debts against each other, thus 
avoiding the absurdity of mak-
ing A pay B when B owes A." 
Citizens at 289 (quoting Studley 
v. Boylston Nat. Bank, 229 U.S. 
523, 528 (1913». The Court 
explained that although the 
Bankruptcy Code does not cre-
ate the right of setoff, section 
553(a) provides that, with cer-
tain exceptions, bankruptcy pre-
serves any existing setoffrights. 
Id. In addition, the Court noted 
that Maryland law allows Citi-
zens to set off the defaulted 
loan against the checking ac-
count balance. Id. The Court 
maintained, moreover, that 
Strumpf's bankruptcy filing 
stayed Citizens' exercise of their 
setoff right according to section 
362(a). Id. 
The court agreed with 
Citizens that the administrative 
hold was not a setoff within the 
meaning of section 362(a)(7), 
and stressed that Citizens' re-
fusal to pay its debt was tempo-
rary while it sought relief under 
section 362(d) from the auto-
matic stay. Id. According to 
the Court, the issue of whether 
the temporary refusal was 
wrongful was "a separate mat-
ter." Id. The Court found that 
a requirement of an intent to 
permanently settle accounts is 
implicit in most state laws re-
garding setoffrights. Id. Mary-
land follows the majority rule 
that a setoff occurs when one (i) 
44- U. Bait. L.F./26.3 
makes a decision to effectuate a 
setoff, (ii) takes some action 
accomplishing the setoff, and 
(iii) enters a recording of the 
setoff. Id. 
If state law differed, the 
Court stated that federal law 
determines whether a section 
362(a)(7) setoff has occurred. 
Id. Consequently, the Court 
recognized that "other provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code. 
.. would lead us to embrace the 
same requirement of an intent 
permanently to settle accounts." 
Id. Because Citizens' freeze of 
Strumpf's checking account 
was not intended to permanent.,. 
ly reduce Strumpf's account 
balance by the amount of the 
defaulted loan, the Court con-
cluded that the administrative 
hold was not a setoff. Id. 
Next, the Court exam-
ined the inconsistency between 
section 362(a)(7)'s right of set-
off and section 542(b)'s provi-
sion concerning the turnover of 
property to the estate. Id. Ac-
cording to Section 542(b), a 
bankrupt's debtor must "pay" 
to the trustee "any debt that is 
property of the estate ... except 
to the extent that such debt may 
be offset under section 553 ... 
against a claim against the debt-
or." Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 
542(b). Section553(a),inturn, 
provides that the Bankruptcy 
Code will not affect a creditor's 
pre bankruptcy setoff rights 
against the debtor "[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided in this sec-
tion and in sections 362 and 
363." !d. On that account, the 
Court found it an "odd con-
struction" of section 362(a)(7) 
to require a creditor with setoff 
rights to pay a claim to which a 
setoff applies when section 
542(b) unequivocally exempts 
such action. Id. 
The court recognized 
that section 553 restricts the 
execution of an actual setoff 
during an automatic stay and 
held that section 553 "undoubt-
edly refers to section 362(a)(7)." 
Id. Furthermore, the Court stat-
ed that the section 553(a) "ex-
cept" clause does not indicate 
that section 362(a)(7) requires 
the immediate payment of a debt 
subject to setoff. Id. For this 
reason, the Court mentioned that 
such an interpretation would 
render section 553(a)'s right of 
setoff meaningless because 
"forcing the creditor to pay its 
debt immediately . . . would 
divest the creditor of the very 
thing that supports the right of 
setoff." Id. 
With respect to 
Strumpf' s argument that the ad-
ministrative hold violated sec-
tions 362(a)(3) and 362(a)(6), 
the Court emphasized that Cit-
izens did not take property or 
exercise dominion over proper-
ty belonging to Strumpf. Id. at 
290. The court stated that a 
section 362(a)(3) bankruptcy 
filing automatically stays "any 
act to obtain possession of prop-
erty of the estate or of property 
from the estate or to exercise 
control over property of the es-
tate." Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 
362(a)(3»). Section 362(a)(6) 
automatically stays "any act to 
collect, assess, or recover a 
claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commence-
ment of the case under this ti-
tIe." !d. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 
363(a)(6)). The Court reiterat-
ed that Citizens' temporaryre-
fusal to pay was neither a taking 
nor an exercise of dominion 
over Strumpfs property. Id. 
Instead, Citizen's refusal was 
merely a refusal to perform its 
promise to pay. Id. Therefore, 
the Court declined to extend an 
interpretation to section 
362(a)(3) or 362(a)(6) that 
would prohibit "the temporary 
refusal of a creditor to pay a 
debt that is subject to setoff 
against a debt owed by the bank-
rupt." Id. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Inholding that the cred-
itor bank of a bankrupt debtor 
may protect its setoff rights by 
temporarily withholding pay-
ment of a debt owed to the debt-
or, the United States Supreme 
Court in Citizens BankofMd. v. 
Strumpf articulated the impor-
tance of protecting such rights 
in bankruptcy proceedings. In 
its basic form, the Citizens Bank 
decision held that an intent to 
permanently settle accounts is 
required when determining 
whether a setoff has occurred. 
Citizens Bank, however, derives 
its true impact by ensuring cred-
itor banks a means of protect-
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ing their se,toff rights against 
bankrupt debtors without vio-
lating the automatic stay im-
posed by section 362 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
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